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INTRODUCTION
As the world becomes a more and more contentious place,
people need outlets to get away from reality. In 2012, 61 percent of
Americans turned to sports as their outlet. 1 While the National
Football League (NFL) is king in America, with over $13 billion of
revenue from 2016-2017, 2 the public’s fascination and obsession with
sports is not limited to the United States. The international community
has an even greater appetite for the world’s most popular sport, soccer;
3.2 billion people tuned into the 2014 FIFA World Cup, including 1
billion watching Germany defeat Argentina in the final. 3
As sports become more and more popular, the business behind
it continues to grow. In 2016, the average NFL franchise value climbed
to $2.34 billion, 4 with the Los Angeles Rams’ value doubling to $2.9
billion after their relocation from St. Louis. 5 NFL teams are not the
only franchises flush with cash, though. Following a television contract
extension with ESPN and TNT, 6 the NBA brought in $5.289 billion
in basketball related income in 2016. 7 The sports industry is a business,
and just like any other business the key to staying in business is to
Allen Hershkowitz, The Greening of Professional Sports, N.Y. TIMES (July 17,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/opinion/the-greening-ofprofessional-sports.html.
2
Jason Belzer, Thanks To Roger Goodell, NFL Revenues Projected to Surpass $13
(Feb.
29,
2016,
11:00
AM),
Billion
In
2016,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbelzer/2016/02/29/thanks-to-roger-goodellnfl-revenues-projected-to-surpass-13-billion-in-2016/#5ef0a341cb79.
3
2014 FIFA World Cup™ reached 3.2 billion viewers, one billion watched final,
FIFA
(Dec.
16,
2015),
http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2015/m=12/news=2014-fifa-worldcuptm-reached-3-2-billion-viewers-one-billion-watched--2745519.html.
4
Mike Ozanian, The NFL’s Most Valuable Teams 2016, FORBES (Sept. 14,
2016, 9:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2016/09/14/thenfls-most-valuable-teams-2016/#2f6ba4b23068.
5
Id.
6
NBA
extends
television
deals,
ESPN
(Feb.
14,
2016),
http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/11652297/nba-extends-television-dealsespn-tnt.
7
Dan Feldman, Report: NBA revenue projected to reach $8 billion next season, NBC
SPORTS (Sept. 16, 2016, 10:05 AM), http://nba.nbcsports.com/2016/09/16/reportnba-revenue-projected-to-reach-8-billion-next-season/.
1
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maintain good relations between management, labor and the customer.
In sports, this means players and owners work together to put out the
best product, and, in turn, hopefully most money. However, as in any
other business, players and owners do not always get along.
Strikes and lockouts in American professional sports are not
uncommon. 8 As recently as 2011, the NFL owners locked out players
for 132 days amidst contentious collective bargaining agreement
negotiations. 9 A labor strike or owner lockout is the biggest threat to
the NFL’s dominant run in American culture, and the current climate
suggests there is potential for labor issues down the road. In August of
2017, DeMaurice Smith, executive director of the NFL Players
Association, said a work stoppage after the current collective
bargaining agreement expires in 2021 is a “virtual certainty.” 10 2021 is
relatively far off in the future, and there is certainly time to mend the
relationship between the NFL leadership and its players. This
relationship is certainly in need of mending at the moment in light of
the 2017 season’s Ezekiel Elliott saga, which began with a six-game
suspension handed down by the NFL on August 11, 2017, 11 and
escalated into a full-blown legal battle in a United State District
Court. 12 The purpose of this Comment is to compare the dispute
resolution mechanisms of European soccer and American football.

8
Lockouts are a labor negotiations tactic employed by management or
ownership of a business by which the employees are coerced into succumbing to
management’s wishes by excluding the employees from their workplace until certain
terms
are
agreed
upon.
See
Lockout,
DICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/lockout (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
9
Topics: NFL Lockout, ESPN (Dec. 5, 2012, 4:08 PM),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/topics/_/page/nfl-labor-negotiations.
10
A.J. Perez, DeMaurice Smith: NFL Lockout or Strike in 2021 is ‘virtual
TODAY
(Aug.
17,
2017,
9:29
PM),
certainty’,
USA
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2017/08/17/demaurice-smith-nfllockout-strike-2021-virtual-certainty/578518001/.
11
Todd Archer, Cowboys’ Ezekiel Elliott Suspended Six Games for Conduct,
ESPN (Aug. 11, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/20302469/ezekielelliott-dallas-cowboys-suspended-six-games.
12
A.J. Perez, NFL Seeks Dismissal of Ezekiel Elliot’s Federal Court Case, USA
TODAY
(Sept.
4,
2017,
1:54
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/cowboys/2017/09/04/ezekielelliott-suspension-lawsuit-nfl-seeks-dismissal/631939001/.
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In Europe, athletes are also not immune to disputes with their
management. Recently, superstar soccer player Neymar Jr. was bought
out of his contract with the Spanish club FC Barcelona by French
powerhouse Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) for a record-breaking $263
million. 13 The move shocked the world, and, more importantly,
shocked FC Barcelona; so much so, in fact, that the club filed suit
against the twenty-five year-old Brazilian for breach of contract. 14
Currently, European soccer and the NFL are structured very
differently when it comes to handling issues between players and
management. European soccer is governed under the leadership of
two regulatory bodies, the Fédération Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA) 15 and the Union of European Football
Associations (UEFA). 16 The NFL, on the other hand is a completely
independent entity; it has its own rules, and is not subject to any
oversight apart from the thirty-two individuals who own the teams. 17
This Comment will compare the structures utilized by the NFL
and European soccer to settle disputes between athletes and their
management. Section I of this comment provides background
information on European soccer, specifically Neymar’s legal situation.
Sections I.A., I.B., and I.C., proceed to outline the current systems in
place for European soccer disputes: the FIFA Dispute Resolution
Chamber, the Court of Arbitration for Sport, and the FIFA
Disciplinary Committee, respectively. Section II of this comment
provides background information on the NFL and the issues it is
13
Jonathan Wilson, Neymar’s Transfer from Barcelona to PSG Defies Belief on All
ILLUSTRATED
(Aug.
3,
2017),
Levels,
SPORTS
https://www.si.com/soccer/2017/08/03/neymar-transfer-psg-barcelona-worldrecord-fee.
14
Matt Bonesteel, Barcelona says Neymar Breached his Contract, Demands he Repay
POST
(Aug.
22,
2017),
Millions
in
Bonus
Money,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/08/22/barcelonasays-neymar-breached-his-contract-demands-he-repay-millions-in-bonus-money/.
15
Governance,
FIFA,
https://www.fifa.com/governance/how-fifaworks/index.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2019).
16
What UEFA Does, UEFA, https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/aboutuefa/what-uefa-does/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2019).
17
Teams, NFL, https://www.nfl.com/teams (last visited Feb. 7, 2018); insert
additional citations
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currently facing. Section II.A. explores the procedures in place under
the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement that deal with grievances
and punishment. Section II.B. describes the two latest major and most
well-known disputes between NFL players and the NFL:
“Deflategate” and the Ezekiel Elliott case. Finally, Section III
challenges the proposed solution of another comment while also
offering another, manageable solution the NFL should undertake.
While the systems in Europe and the NFL are very different
and both have their flaws, they have adapted to the unique needs of
the sports they govern. Despite fears that the NFL will cease to exist
if DeMaurice Smith’s comments come to fruition, the NFL, with some
minor tweaking, is in great shape to continue its dominant run in
America. This Comment will demonstrate this point, articulate why
major reform in American sports aiming to replicate the European
model is not needed, and demonstrate that both European soccer and
the NFL will only continue to succeed.
I. EUROPEAN SOCCER BACKGROUND
The transfer window is among the most exciting times for
soccer fans. The transfer of players within the transfer window is a
system of player movement that is similar to free agency in American
sports, but operates in a manner that is unique to international soccer. 18
Like the salary cap that is found in most major American sports, 19 the
transfer system was first implemented in the late nineteenth century as
a means to prevent the wealthy clubs from using their financial clout
to attract all the top players without compensating the former club. 20
The transfer window is the common term for what FIFA defines as a
See Andi Thomas, The European Soccer Transfer Market, Explained (July 28,
2014), https://www.sbnation.com/soccer/2014/7/28/5923187/transfer-windowsoccer-europe-explained.
19
Three of the four “major” sports leagues, which include the National
Football League, National Basketball League, National Hockey League, and Major
League Baseball, employ a salary cap in order to curb spending on free agents and
allow teams in smaller markets to compete with wealthier teams. Only Major League
Baseball does not employ a salary cap.
20
See generally James G. Irving, Red Card: The Battle Over European Football’s
Transfer System, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 667 (2002).
18

534

2019

Throwing a Flag on Roger Goodell's Heavy Hand

7:2

registration period. 21 Each year there are two transfer windows, which
serve as the exclusive periods for which players may be registered with
new clubs. 22 The first transfer window begins sometime after one
season ends and closes before the next season begins. 23 This window
is not to last more than twelve weeks. 24 The second window occurs
during the middle of the season and cannot “exceed four weeks.” 25
This mid-season period is mainly used for technical and tactical
adjustments as well as to allow teams to replace injured players. 26
During the first 2017 window, which lasted from June 1 to
September 1, 7,590 transfers across the globe occurred at a combined
expense of $4.71 billion. 27 This was a record-breaking figure that
almost amounted to what teams spent in transfer fees in all of 2016. 28
It is this free-wheeling system that led to a dispute between Neymar Jr.
and FC Barcelona; the controversial transfer was a consequence of the
Spanish club’s assertion that “Neymar was not for sale.” 29 However,
Neymar’s contract contained a buy-out clause, enabling him to
unilaterally terminate the contract for €222 million ($263,347,500), a
21
See FIFA REGULATIONS ON THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS,
art. 6 § 1 (2007) [hereinafter FIFA REGULATIONS].
22
Id.
23
Id. § 2.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
FIFA COMMENTARY ON THE REGULATIONS FOR THE STATUS AND
TRANSFER
OF
PLAYERS
22
(2006),
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved
=2ahUKEwjgyq_94KrhAhUiVt8KHTsmBKwQFjAAegQIARAC&url=http%3A
%2F%2Fwww.thefa.com%2F-%2Fmedia%2Ffiles%2Fthefaportal%2Fgovernancedocs%2Fregistrations%2Fdecember-2015-updates%2Fcommentary-on-theregulations-for-the-status-and-transfer-ofplayers.ashx&usg=AOvVaw0dGntpuM0pNcN2A1BuIV4N [hereinafter FIFA
COMMENTARY].
27
Big 5 Report: New Record High in Transfer Fees this Summer, FIFA (Sept. 13,
2017), http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2017/m=9/news=big-5-reportnew-record-high-in-transfer-fees-this-summer-2907752.html.
28
Id.
29
Andy Hunter, Julien Laurens, and Sid Lowe, Neymar Set to seal World-record
Move to PSG Worth £450 in Fees and Wages, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2017, 3:44 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/aug/02/neymar-psg-barcelona-tellsteam-mates-leave.
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fee which PSG paid. 30 Neymar has not publicly revealed his reasons
for wanting to leave FC Barcelona, a club FiveThirtyEight.com ranks
near the top of its “Global Club Soccer Rankings,” 31 although there
has been speculation that Neymar wanted an “opportunity to lead the
pack.” 32 This was not possible at FC Barcelona due to the presence of
Lionel Messi, who signed a new contract in the summer of 2017 33 and
is considered one of the top two players in the world. 34
Buy-out clauses are common in many types of contracts, both
in America and abroad, and are especially crucial to the soccer transfer
system. As previously discussed, the transfer system was originally
implemented to protect smaller clubs. 35 Buy-out clauses add an
additional layer of protection. Without contractual buy-outs, teams,
especially wealthy teams, would not be able to exert the level of
financial influence that is seen during the transfer windows and at the
frequency with which they do. This is because, like free agency in
American sports, after a player’s contract expires, another team can
sign them without paying a transfer fee. The hybrid nature of the
European system is a result of the 1995 ruling of the European Court
of Justice in a case brought by Dutch player Jean-Marc Bosman. 36 The
European Court of Justice held that the transfer system for “out-ofcontract” players infringed upon players’ freedom of movement, and
“was to immediately cease.” 37
30
Squire Patton Boggs, The Neymar Transfer: An Analysis of Buy-Out Clauses –
PATTON
BOGGS
(Aug.
3,
2017),
Part
1,
SQUIRE
http://www.sports.legal/2017/08/the-neymar-transfer-an-analysis-of-buy-outclauses-part-1/.
31
Jay Boice & Julia Wolfe, Global Club Soccer Rankings, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT,
https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/global-club-soccer-rankings/ (last updated
Mar. 30, 2019, 5:39 PM).
32
Tim Vickery, Neymar: What would Motivate Brazil Forward to Leave Barcelona?,
BBC SPORT (Aug. 2, 2017), www.bbc.com/sport/football/40767713.
33
Id.
34
There is a heated debate amongst soccer fans over whether Messi or
Portuguese and Real Madrid star, Cristiano Ronaldo deserves the title of best in the
world. See Messi v. Ronaldo – Goals, Stats for Messi & Cristiano Ronaldo,
MESSIVSRONALDO, messivsronaldo.net (last updated Mar. 30, 2019).
35
See generally, Irving, supra note 20.
36
See id. at 684–85.
37
Id.
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In Spain, buy-out clauses are permissible under Spanish law, as
well as under the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players. 38 According to FIFA’s “Commentary on the Regulations for
the Status and Transfer of Players” (FIFA Commentary), breaches of
contract, which Neymar’s move would likely amount to, “give rise to
compensation.” 39 However the team and player contract for the
amount a player must pay to unilaterally terminate the contract
“without a valid reason.” 40 The FIFA Commentary also notes that in
certain countries, including Spain, buy-out clauses are mandatory
pursuant to sports legislation. 41
The validity of buy-out clauses in soccer contracts was
confirmed by the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Al Gharafa S.C &
M. Bresciano v. Al Nasr S.C. & FIFA. 42 The Al Gharafa case involved a
situation similar to Neymar’s. 43 Mark Bresciano was an Australian
player who played for Al Nasr S.C. of the United Emirates. 44 Bresciano
unilaterally transferred to the Qatari club Al Gharafa S.C. after contract
re-negotiations with Al Nasr failed. 45 The year prior, Bresciano had
signed a three-year contract with Al Nasr and was in contact with the
team’s coach regarding training. 46 He nonetheless terminated the
contract, prompting action by Al Nasr. 47 The matter was initially
decided against Bresciano by FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber 48
causing Bresciano to appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS). 49 The CAS acknowledged the FIFA Commentary, and
reasoned that the parties (ordinarily, the club) accept in advance that
FIFA COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 47 n. 76.
See id. at 46.
40
Id. at 47.
41
Id. n. 76; Real Decreto 1006/1985 of 26 June (For the Regulation of the
Employment of Professional Sportspeople).
42
Al Gharafa S.C & Mark Bresciano v. Al Nasr S.C. & Fédération Internationale
de Football Association (FIFA), Arbitration CAS 2013/A/3411 at 7 [hereinafter Al
Gharafa S.C.].
43
See generally Id.
44
Id. at 7.
45
See id.
46
Id. at 4–5.
47
Id.
48
See infra Part I.A.
49
Id. at 13.
38
39
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the contract may be terminated. 50 Thus, such termination can be
deemed to be based on the parties’ prior consent. 51 The court noted,
however, that a buy-out is not created when a term sets out the
“consequences ‘if’ the contract is terminated, or if it refers to ‘damages’
caused by the player’s “‘cancellation of the contract.’” 52 In Al Gharafa S.C.,
unlike in the Neymar situation, Bresciano lost and had to pay damages
because the contract spoke of damages in the event that the contract
was terminated. 53
The legality of the buy-out clause Neymar and PSG took
advantage of is not the issue, however. In a statement on the club’s
website, FC Barcelona made public their demand that Neymar return
the prepaid consideration for his contract renewal, €8.5 million in
damages, and “an additional 10% because of delayed payment.” 54
Barcelona also requested the PSG indemnify Neymar should he be
unable to pay the demanded fees. 55 A key element of the impending
legal battle is the payment of a loyalty bonus to Neymar; in Neymar’s
countersuit, he is claiming that he is owed a €26 million loyalty bonus
stemming from his October 2016 contract. 56 The contract reportedly
entitled Neymar to a bonus after July 31, 2017, or “one year into his
contract.” 57 “[A]lthough the release clause was triggered” on August 3,
2017, Barcelona “claim[s] that he had made the decision to leave before
the end of July.” 58 The suit will likely depend on the specific language
Id. at 26–27.
Id.
52
Id. at 1.
53
Id. at 27–28.
54
FC Barcelona Statement, FC BARCELONA (Aug. 22, 2017, 2:58 PM),
https://www.fcbarcelona.com/club/news/2017-2018/fc-barcelona-statement-2208-2017.
55
Id.
56
Lloyd P. Thomas & Simon Grossobel, The Neymar Transfer Saga Continues,
PATTON
BOGGS
(Aug.
28,
2017),
SQUIRE
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a3da9c9d-65f4-44c2-8df9e071b69881cd (“It is noteworthy that Barcelona have brought their claim before the
Jutjat Social, the Catalonian Labour Tribunal, although the club have passed the claim
onto the Spanish Football Federation for referral to FIFA and the French Football
Federation.”).
57
Id.
58
Id.
50
51
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of the contract and any evidence that Neymar actually decided to end
his time with Barcelona before the date the bonus was due. 59
FC Barcelona brought their claim before the Jutjat Social, a
Catalonian Labour Tribunal, despite the fact that the team referred the
issue to FIFA. 60 This is unlike the situation in Al Gharafa, where Al
Nasr brought the claim before FIFA before the case was ultimately
decided by the CAS. 61 Usually, disputes arising out of transfers that
cross international borders, like the Bresciano and Neymar transfers,
are heard by FIFA. 62 The decision to file with the Jutjat Social was a
most likely part of the club’s litigation strategy, and the policies and
procedures of the Jutjat Social are outside the scope of this article. The
objective of outlining Neymar’s situation is to provide a current
example of the types of issues the FIFA system attempts to resolve,
rather than analyze the merits of the case.
While the Neymar saga may not end with a ruling from the
FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber or the CAS, the international
attention garnered and the timing of the dispute conveniently
juxtaposed the legal battle that took place in the United States between
the NFL and Ezekiel Elliott. 63 The NFL has deservedly received
criticism over how it resolves disputes involving players, especially
after the “Deflategate” 64 scandal and the Elliott case. Such criticism
has led some to suggest that the NFL should look into adopting

Id.
See id.
61
See generally Al Gharafa S.C., supra note 42.
62
See id.
63
See Around the NFL staff, Cowboys RB Ezekiel Elliott Suspension Case
Timeline,
NFL
(Sept.
11,
2017,
9:47
AM),
www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000841151/article/cowboys-rb-ezekiel-elliottsuspension-case-timeline.
64
The legal saga between New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady
and the NFL was dubbed “Deflategate” due to the claim that Brady had intentionally
deflated footballs during a playoff game. See discussion infra Section II.B; Deflategate
Timeline: After 544 Days, Tom Brady Gives in, ESPN (July 15, 2016),
http://www.espn.com/blog/new-england-patriots/post/_/id/4782561/timelineof-events-for-deflategate-tom-brady [hereinafter Deflategate Timeline].
59
60
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procedures similar to those found in European soccer. 65 Before
turning to this argument, outlining how European soccer resolves
disputes is important.
A. FIFA Dispute Resolution
In 2015, a lengthy investigation by the United States
Department of Justice uncovered numerous instances of bribery
within FIFA. 66 The investigation primarily focused on the 2010
awarding of the 2018 and 2022 World Cups to Russia and Qatar,
respectively, and led to the resignation of FIFA President Sepp
Blatter. 67 Despite FIFA’s recent reputation, the governing body for
international soccer’s system for dispute resolution remains credible.
Independent of the countries whose teams are members, FIFA makes
it its “duty to provide the most stable and sustainable foundations for
the game.” 68 FIFA was founded in 1904 under Swiss law and is
currently located in Zurich, Switzerland. 69 FIFA is run primarily
through its Congress. 70 The Congress meets once a year to pass new
statutes and to elect FIFA’s President and various committee
members. 71 Such committees include the Disciplinary Committee and
the Appeals Committee. The Disciplinary Committee, in accordance
with the FIFA Disciplinary Code can impose sanctions on most parties

65
See Trevor E. Brice, Labor Pains on the Playing Field: Why Taking a Page from
Europe’s Playbook Could Help the United States, 20 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 49, 49–54 (2013)
(advocating a “two-tiered approach to solving American professional sports’ culture
of frequent work stoppages” involving the adoption of regulatory boards akin to
FIFA and UEFA and legislation modeled after the Railway Labor Act).
66
See Austin Knoblauch & Barry Stavro, A Timeline of the FIFA Scandal, LOS
ANGELES
TIMES
(June
2,
2015,
4:40
PM),
http://www.latimes.com/sports/soccer/la-sp-fifa-scandal-timeline-20150603story.html.
67
See id.
68
The Reform Process, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/governance/how-fifaworks/the-reform-process.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).
69
History of FIFA - Foundation, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/who-we-are/history/index.html (last visited April 7, 2019).
70
FIFA STATUTES: REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE
STATUTES; STANDING ORDERS OF THE CONGRESS [hereinafter FIFA STATUTES] art.
25 § 2.
71
Id.
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involved with international soccer. 72 These parties include teams,
players, officials, and agents. 73 However, the Congress and FIFA
Council reserve the disciplinary power in the case of the suspension or
exclusion of any member. 74 The Disciplinary Committee, per the FIFA
Statutes, may pass decisions “only when at least three members are
present,” but “[i]n certain cases, the chairperson may rule alone.” 75
When disputes arise between players and their clubs, the dispute is
heard by the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC). 76 The DRC
“provides arbitration and dispute resolution on the basis of equal
representation of players and clubs and an independent chairman.” 77
The DRC handles issues such as labor disputes, claims for training
compensation, and overdue payables. 78
The DRC is FIFA’s main dispute resolution body. 79 As such,
its decisions are enforceable only through FIFA’s statutes, 80 and are
very important in the international soccer community. The members
of FIFA must fully comply with DRC decisions. 81 According to the
FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (FIFA
Regulations), the DRC adjudicates only “in the presence of at least
three members,” which includes the DRC chairman or deputy
Id. art. 53 § 2.
Id.
74
Disciplinary
Committee,
FIFA,
http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/committees/committee=1882042/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).
75
FIFA STATUTES, supra note 70, art. 53 § 1.
76
Players’ Status and Transfers: Dispute Resolution Chamber, FIFA,
http://www.fifa.com/governance/dispute-resolution-system/index.html
(last
visited Jan. 10, 2018).
77
Id.
78
Decisions of Dispute Resolution Chamber, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/official-documents/governance/dispute-resolution-chamber.html (last visited
Mar. 31, 2019).
79
See Players’ Status and Transfers: Dispute Resolution Chamber, FIFA,
http://www.fifa.com/governance/dispute-resolution-system/index.html
(last
visited April 9, 2019).
80
See generally, FIFA STATUTES, supra note 70, art. 53.
81
FIFA STATUTES, supra note 70, art. 14, § 1(a). See Ian Blackshaw, ADR
and Sport: Settling Disputes Through the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the FIFA Dispute
Resolution Chamber, and the WIPO Arbitration & Mediation Center, 24 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 1, 34 (2013) (outlining alternative dispute resolution in sports, including the
FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber and Court of Arbitration for Sport).
72
73
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chairman. 82 The DRC consists of twenty-six members, equally
representing the players and the clubs. 83 Player representatives are
nominated by FIFPro, the international players union, and the club
representatives are nominated by the various member leagues via the
member clubs. 84 In a certain cases, 85 however, a DRC judge, designated
by the members of the DRC, may settle the case because the disputes
are clear-cut with unquestionable facts. 86 Any cases which concern
“fundamental issues” are to be referred to the chamber. 87
Conveniently, the FIFA Commentary outlines what qualifies as a
fundamental issue that must be submitted to the DRC panel;
fundamental issues include situations “not covered by exiting
jurisprudence and for which discussions within the chamber are
essential,” situations “in which existing jurisprudence needs to be
extended or amended,” and situations “that have a major impact on
the daily application and interpretation of the Regulations.” 88
Procedurally, the DRC is governed by the FIFA Rules Governing the
Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute
Resolution Chamber (Procedural Rules). 89
Importantly, the Procedural Rules state that members of the
DRC may not participate in the adjudication of cases in which they
have a personal interest. 90 This provision is especially important in light
of FIFA’s recent reputation and serves to add legitimacy into DRC
proceedings. If a member’s impartiality is called into “legitimate
doubt” by a party, the party can challenge and submit evidence of
FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 21, art. 24 § 2.
FIFA, RULES GOVERNING THE PROCEDURES OF THE PLAYERS’ STATUS
COMMITTEE AND THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION CHAMBER art. 4 (2014) [hereinafter
PROCEDURAL RULES].
84
FIFA COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 71–73.
85
Article 24 of the FIFA Regulations lists three scenarios in which the DRC
judge may adjudicate: 1) “all disputes up to a litigious value of CHF 100,000” (Swiss
Francs); 2) disputes relating to the calculation of “training compensation”; and 3)
disputes relating to the calculation of “solidarity contributions.” FIFA
REGULATIONS, supra note 21, art. 24, § 2.
86
Id. See FIFA COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 73.
87
FIFA COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 73.
88
Id.
89
See generally, PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 83.
90
See id, art. 7 § 1.
82
83
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impartiality within five days. 91 The DRC will first determine whether it
is the proper body to hear the case, and will then determine which of
the FIFA statues apply. 92 In a recent DRC decision, the Committee
resolved a contract dispute regarding the unilateral termination in favor
of the claimant player. 93A reading of a DRC decision will reveal that
the body operates very transparently, including making note of which
of its Procedural Rules it relied on at each stage of its determination. 94
Rulings are required within thirty days if made by the DRC judge, or
within sixty days if made by the chamber. 95
B. CAS Arbitration
The CAS, just like FIFA, is headquartered in Switzerland. 96
The CAS is recognized by the FIFA Statutes as the body to which
parties may appeal final decisions passed by FIFA’s legal bodies. 97
However, these appeals may only take place “after all other internal
channels have been exhausted” 98 and only in certain cases. 99 Further,
in order to ensure a consistent body of precedent, FIFA generally
denies parties the ability to seek recourse in ordinary courts of law. 100
The CAS was originally created to handle international sports disputes

See id. art. 7 § 2.
Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, FIFA 4 (May 18, 2017),
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02/90/72/
72/05170017-e.pdf.
93
See generally id.
94
See generally id.
95
FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 21, art. 25 § 1.
96
See Addresses and contacts, COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, www.tascas.org/en/general-information/addresses-and-contacts.html (last visited Jan. 10,
2018).
97
FIFA STATUTES, supra note 70, art. 58 § 2.
98
Id.
99
Id. art. 58 § 3 (barring appeals to the CAS in cases arising under the
following situations: 1) “violations of the Laws of the Game”; 2) suspensions of up
to four matches or up to three months (with the exception of doping decisions)”; 3)
decisions against which an appeal to an independent and duly constituted arbitration
tribunal recognised under the rules of an association or confederation may be
made”).
100
See id. art. 59 § 2.
91
92
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in a “specialized forum,” allowing for efficient adjudication of
disputes. 101
The CAS is governed by its Code of Sports-Related
Arbitration, which outlines four separate procedures, including
Ordinary Arbitration, Appeal Arbitration, the Ad hoc Division, and
Mediation. 102 The Appeal Arbitration division of the CAS is most
relevant to European soccer, as it is the place where parties may appeal
DRC rulings. 103 Appeals from bodies like the DRC account for around
90% of the CAS caseload, 45% of which come specifically from some
body of FIFA. 104 All appeals are heard by a panel of one or three
arbitrators. 105 The CAS has become the prominent international sports
tribunal, and has even been credited with developing lex sportive, the
principles of international law. 106 However, as a court of arbitration,
the CAS is not bound by preceding decisions. 107 Instead, the CAS
applies lex sportive to each case before it. 108
CAS panels, like the DRC, features either one or three
arbitrators selected from a “geographically representative” list of 264
CAS members. 109 The number of arbitrators can be decided via an
arbitration agreement between the parties, or, absent prior agreement,
by the President of the Appeal Arbitration Division, “taking into

101
See Louise Reilly, Symposium, An Introduction to the Court of Arbitration for
Sport (CAS) & the Role of National Courts in International Sports Disputes, 2012 J. DISP.
RESOL. 63, 63 (2012).
102
Id. at 64.
103
See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 70, art. 57.
104
Reilly, supra note 101, at 65, 69.
105
COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED
ARBITRATION,
art.
R40.1,
http://www.tascas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Code_2017_FINAL__en_.pdf (last visited Oct. 13,
2017) [hereinafter CAS CODE].
106
See Jennifer Bondulich, Rescuing the “Supreme Court” of Sports: Reforming the
Court of Arbitration for Sport Arbitration Member Selection Procedures, 42 BROOKLYN J.
INT’L L. 275, 279 (2016) (exploring the objectivity of the CAS and arguing that CAS
awards should be given precedential value in arbitration decisions so as to compel
arbitrators to rule more consistently and fairly).
107
See id.
108
See id.
109
See Reilly, supra note 101, at 65.
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account the circumstances of the case.” 110 The DRC members are
appointed based on the nomination of the clubs and players. 111 In
contrast, “CAS members are required to have full legal training,
recognized competence with regard to sports law and/or international
arbitration, a good knowledge of sport in general and a good command
of at least one CAS working language.” 112 Like DRC panelists, CAS
arbitrators are to “remain impartial and independent” and must
“disclose any circumstances which may affect her/his” ability to fairly
hear a case. 113 It is also significant that the parties have the ability to
agree on the arbitrators who will hear the case. 114 Per the CAS Code of
Sports-Related Arbitration (CAS Code), if one arbitrator is to hear the
case, the parties have fifteen days to agree to a selection, otherwise the
President of the Division goes through with the appointment. 115 If the
panel is to consist of three arbitrators, each party selects an arbitrator,
and together, those two individuals select the third panelist, the
President of the Panel. 116
Much like how the DRC applies a consistent set of “law” to its
proceedings, regardless of where the actual dispute is heard, the CAS
proceedings are governed by the law agreed upon by the parties. 117 In
the absence of a choice of law by the parties, Chapter 12 of the Swiss
Act on Private International Law Act applies to the proceedings. 118
However, this is only the case if one of the parties was not domiciled,
nor had a “habitual residence in Switzerland.” 119 When it comes to the
merits of the case, a CAS panel “has full power to review the facts and
the law” and “may issue a new decision which replaces the decision
challenged or annul the decision and refer the case back to the previous
CAS CODE, supra note 105, art. R40.1.
The FIFA Statutes, FIFA Commentary, and FIFA Regulations do not
provide clarity on the requirements of proposed members. See FIFA STATUTES, supra
note 70; FIFA COMMENTARY, supra note 26; FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 21.
112
Reilly, supra note 101, at 65; Reilly, supra note 101, at 65 n. 13 (“The CAS
working languages are English and French.”).
113
CAS CODE, supra note 105, art. R33.
114
Id. art. R40.2.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. art. R45.
118
See Reilly, supra note 101, at 68.
119
Id.
110
111
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instance.” 120 The main sources of law used by CAS panels are the rules
and regulations of the sporting body from which the challenge came. 121
This feature of the CAS is important because it requires that CAS
arbitrators stay current with the rules and regulations of the various
governing bodies from which appeals come. Since 1998, the FIFA
Congress has met every year to shape international soccer through the
FIFA Statutes, the goals being “to improve the game of football
constantly. . . .” 122 The CAS reviews any dispute either directly or
indirectly related to sport, including those of a commercial or
disciplinary nature, and “[a]ny individual or legal entity with capacity
to act may have recourse to the services of the CAS.” 123 Therefore,
CAS arbitrators, have to remain knowledgeable of the issues and
changes occurring in an array of sports, organizations, and industries.
Additionally, it allows for consistent and predictable rulings, both key
for any judicial body’s image.
The CAS also recognizes the importance of sports disputes
being resolved swiftly. As will be discussed, much of the criticism
lobbed at the NFL recently has been related to the almost obscene
amount of time the “Deflategate” saga took up. Contrary to time issues
that have beleaguered the NFL’s public image, the CAS attempts to
receive and resolve cases in a timely manner. The CAS will only accept
a decision if the disputed ruling’s comes from a federation whose
statutes allow for CAS arbitration and if the appellant has exhausted
all possible remedies within its federation. 124 Where no time limit is set
by the statutes of the concerned federation, the CAS imposes an appeal
time limit of “twenty-one-days from the receipt” of the challenged
decision. 125 The appellant has just an additional ten days to file a brief
outlining the facts, arguments, witnesses to be called and any evidence

CAS CODE, supra note 105, art. R57.
Reilly, supra note 101, at 68; CAS CODE, supra note 105, art. R58.
122
About FIFA: FIFA Congress, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/fifa-congress/all-you-need-to-know/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
123
Frequently Asked Questions, COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT,
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-information/frequently-asked-questions.html
(last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
124
CAS CODE, supra note 105, art. R47.
125
Id. art. R49.
120
121
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for the CAS to consider. 126 After this, the respondent has twenty days
to file its answer which must include a statement of defense, including
any affirmative defenses, evidence, and witnesses to be called along
with their expected testimony. 127 Failure to answer within the twenty
day period will result in the CAS proceeding with the arbitration and
delivering an award without considering the respondent’s defense. 128
While ordinary CAS procedures last between six and twelve months,
an award on an appeal must be announced within three months. 129
Importantly, upon agreement of the parties, the CAS will expedite its
process and set guidelines in accordance with the parties’
circumstances. 130 This is especially important in an athletic context, as
it may allow a winning athlete to compete sooner than he or she
normally would. The CAS has even conducted proceedings via videoconference in order to speed up of the process even more. 131
The CAS could also “grant provisional and conservatory
measures.” 132 Such measures are particularly important when an athlete
has an upcoming competition and wants a stay of the suspension in
order to participate. 133 Those who followed the Ezekiel Elliot situation
would recognize this mechanism, as it is similar to the requests he
made to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York in October
and November of 2017 in hopes of playing while his appeal was heard

Id. art. R51.
Id. art. R55.
128
Id.
129
Frequently Asked Questions, COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT,
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-information/frequently-asked-questions.html
(last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
130
CAS CODE, supra note 105, art. R52.
131
See Reilly, supra note 101, at 72. In August of 2010, Australian swimmer
Ryan Napoleon was sanctioned with a three-month suspension for an anti-doping
violation. Id. In September, he appealed to the CAS. Id. His appeal included a request
for an urgent decision in order to compete at the Commonwealth Games in India in
early October. Id. After the international swimming federation (FINA) agreed to the
expedited procedure, the CAS conducted its hearing with the President of the Panel
in London and two other panelists in Lausanne, Switzerland and Sydney, Australia
via video-conferencing. Id. The panel delivered its decision just eleven days after the
appeal and Napoleon was able to compete. Id.
132
Id.; CAS CODE, supra note 105, art. R37.
133
See Reilly, supra note 101, at 72.
126
127
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(discussed infra). 134 When deciding whether to preliminarily grant relief,
the President of the Appellate Division or the CAS Panel (depending
on what stage relief is sought) considers “whether the relief is necessary
to protect the applicant from irreparable harm, the likelihood of
success on the merits of the claim, and whether the interests of the”
party seeking relief “outweigh” the opposing party’s interests. 135 Any
preliminary relief granted, however, will be annulled if the party
seeking relief fails to file a “related request for arbitration within [ten]
days” after requesting the provisional measure. 136
Like the CAS’s demands on its arbitrators to stay current with
any relevant sports law, the ability of parties seeking relief to expedite
the process and obtain preliminary stays contributes to the legitimacy
of CAS proceedings and awards. CAS awards are rendered based on a
majority decision of the three-arbitrator panel. 137 Additionally, CAS
awards state a brief reasoning for the panel’s decision. 138 Should the
losing party wish to challenge a CAS decision, they must file such
challenge with the Swiss Federal Tribunal. 139 Challenges of CAS
decisions have increased to the point that a large portion of the Swiss
Federal Tribunal’s case load dealing with international arbitration
comes from the CAS. 140 However, this does not mean that parties
around the world do not respect the legitimacy of the CAS rather, the
large number of challenged CAS awards can be attributed to the
number of cases the CAS receives. 141 Moreover, unlike other
arbitrational bodies, CAS awards may only be appealed to the Swiss
Federal Tribunal. 142 FIFA, unlike some federations, explicitly requires
134
Jared Dubin, Ezekiel Elliot asks Court for Administrative Stay that Would
(Nov.
2,
2017),
Allow
Him
to
Play
Sunday,
CBS SPORTS
https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/ezekiel-elliott-asks-court-foradministrative-stay-that-would-allow-him-to-play-sunday/.
135
See CAS CODE, supra note 105, art. R37.
136
Id.
137
Id. art. R50, R59.
138
Id. art. 59.
139
Reilly, supra note 101, at 75.
140
See id.
141
See id. at 76 (pointing out that the number of cases received by the CAS
has grown at a similar rate as CAS-related judgments rendered by the Swiss Federal
Tribunal).
142
See CAS CODE, supra note 105, art. R59
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compliance with CAS awards. 143 The FIFA Statutes require that
members comply not only with FIFA regulations, but also with
decisions of the CAS passed on the basis of an appeal from a FIFA
body. 144 Further, the Statutes require that member associations and
confederations place a provision in their own statutes recognizing the
jurisdiction and authority of the CAS and giving “priority to arbitration
as a means of dispute resolution.” 145 Failure to adhere to a CAS award
subjects the violator to sanctions. 146 These sanctions can include fines,
transfer bans, and in serious cases, expulsion from FIFA. 147
FIFA’s insistence of the recognition of the CAS as a legitimate
and final stage for all disputes has the effect of making sports-related
disputes in Europe matter-of-fact occurrences. Players and teams (and
attorneys) know what the standards are, how the relevant procedures
are carried out, and who they must win over. Unlike some high-profile
NFL legal battles, there is no debating over which Federal Court an
appeal should be heard in, or whether a certain judge is more likely to
rule one way or the other. Most importantly, time-consuming
mechanisms can irritate fans. The fans largely control the economics
of sport; they buy the tickets, merchandise and watch on television.
The DRC and CAS’s policies and procedures work toward keeping
fans focused on the action on the field rather than in the courtroom.
Despite its prominence in the international sports community,
the CAS, like the NFL, has been subjected to criticism; critics initially
pointed to the CAS’s “close ties” to the International Olympic
Committee, and athletes claimed that this closeness illegitimatized CAS
(“The award . . . shall be final and binding upon the parties subject to recourse
available in certain circumstances pursuant to Swiss Law. . . . It may not be
challenged by way of an action for setting aside to the extent that the parties have no
domicile, habitual residence, or business establishment in Switzerland and that they
have expressly excluded all setting aside proceedings in the arbitration agreement or
in an agreement entered into subsequently, in the particular at the outset of the
arbitration.”).
143
FIFA STATUTES, supra note 70, art. 14 § 1(a).
144
Id.
145
Id. art. 15 § f.; Id. art. 23 § f.
146
See id. art. 61.
147
FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, art. 64 §§ 1a)-d) (2017) [hereinafter FIFA
DISCIPLINARY CODE].
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proceedings. 148 The CAS has since taken steps to improve its image,
like founding the International Council of Arbitration for Sport to
operate the CAS instead of the IOC. 149 While some have called for
even greater reform of the CAS, 150 such measures are steps in the right
direction. As will be discussed infra, the NFL would be smart to take
similar measures to instill confidence in its players and fans.
C. FIFA Disciplinary Committee
As previously mentioned, the FIFA Statutes grant the power
of disciplining players, clubs, associations, officials, and other FIFA
related parties to the Disciplinary Committee, except in the case of the
suspension or expulsion of member associations. 151 The Disciplinary
Committee is governed by the FIFA Disciplinary Code, which governs
infringements of the rules in “every match and competition organised
by FIFA.” 152 The Disciplinary Code bans acts such as “[i]nciting hatred
and violence,” 153 brawling during a game, 154 “[p]rovoking the general
public,” 155 as well as other acts that can be classified as
unsportsmanlike. 156 Significantly, the only specific conduct by an
individual occurring outside of a match that is mentioned in the
seventy-four pages of rules is a ban on doping. 157 In very general
language, Article 70 of the Disciplinary Code states that “[t]he judicial
bodies of FIFA reserve the right to sanction serious infringements of
the statutory objectives of FIFA . . . if associations, confederations and
other sports organisations fail to prosecute serious infringements or
fail to prosecute in compliance with the fundamental principles of
law.” 158 While the scope of the Disciplinary Code is conduct during
See Bondulich, supra note 106, at 280.
Id.; History of the CAS, COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT,
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-information/history-of-the-cas.html
(last
visited Oct. 12, 2017).
150
See Bondulich, supra note 106, at 327–28.
151
See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 70, art. 53.
152
FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 147, art. 2.
153
Id. art. 53.
154
Id. art. 50.
155
Id. art. 54.
156
See generally id.
157
Id. art. 63.
158
Id. art. 70 § 2.
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FIFA sanctioned competition, this article appears to grant FIFA broad
power to sanction any conduct that cuts against its “statutory
objectives.” 159 This view is strengthened when Article 70 is read in
conjunction with what the FIFA Statutes declare to be FIFA’s
objectives; FIFA’s objectives include the promotion of soccer
“globally in the light of its unifying, educational, cultural and
humanitarian values” 160 and the promotion of “integrity, ethics and . . .
all methods or practices . . . which might jeopardise the integrity of
matches,
competitions,
players,
officials
and
member
associations. . . .” 161 FIFA itself determines what is contrary to its
objectives; however, the Disciplinary Code implicitly places the burden
of handling issues that fall outside the field of play on the various teams
and leagues. In fact, the word “criminal” appears just once in the
Disciplinary Code. 162 Associations are obligated to remove people who
are “under prosecution for action unworthy of such a position
(especially doping, corruption, forgery)” or dishonest crimes, or “who
has been convicted of a criminal offence in the past five years.” 163
Thus, it appears as though it is incumbent on the individual
associations and clubs within FIFA to discipline players who run into
conflicts with the law. However, the extent of such discipline is not
clear.
The English Premier League is the top soccer league in
England, boasting powerful teams like Chelsea F.C. and Manchester
United. The Premier League is governed by the Football Association
(FA), which governs all of English soccer. 164 Among the Football
Association’s published policies are rules on betting and integrity,
registration of players, and financial regulation; 165 policies similar to
those put in place by FIFA.

Id. art. 2.
FIFA STATUTES, supra note 70, art. 2 § a.
161
Id. art. 2 § g.
162
FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 147, art. 68.
163
FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 147, art. 68 § b).
164
Premier
League
Safeguarding,
PREMIER
LEAGUE,
https://www.premierleague.com/safeguarding (last visited Jan. 11, 2017).
165
Policies, THE FA, www.thefa.com/football-rules-governance/policies
(last visited Jan. 11, 2017).
159
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The FA also promulgates a handbook for each season; the FA
Handbook governs the conduct of all participants within the FA. 166
Section E of the Handbook states that the FA may act against any
participant “in respect of any Misconduct.” 167 Misconduct is defined
as a breach of the “[l]aws of the [g]ame,” the rules described in the FA
Handbook, the statute and regulations of FIFA and UEFA, the rules
of any other affiliated association or competition, and any order or
direction of the FA. 168 The misconduct section goes on to require
adherence to many rules similar to FIFA, including bans against
discrimination, 169 betting, 170 and a mandate to maintain the integrity of
matches and competitions. 171 Unlike FIFA, however, the FA
Handbook has a specific section regarding criminal offenses
committed by participants. 172 The FA has the power to suspend
anyone who has been convicted of a criminal offense because the
convicted participants continued participation constitutes a “risk of
physical harm” to other participants. 173 In addition, the FA has the
power to suspend participants based on allegations of criminal
offenses that may involve breaches of the Handbook’s betting and
integrity policies. 174 Such allegations include criminal gambling rings or
accepting bribes. 175 The significance of these two policies, when read
in conjunction, is that the FA, based on its Handbook, does not have
the power to suspend participants for alleged criminal offenses
unrelated to the integrity of the game. Based on the FA Handbook and
the FIFA Statutes and Regulations, the policy in international soccer
appears to be one where the governing bodies largely allow law
enforcement to handle criminal behavior by players, coaches, and
others. The governing bodies only become involved when the legal
system has run its course. As will be shown, this is very different from

166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175

THE FA, THE FA HANDBOOK art. E §1 (2018/2019).
Id.
Id.
Id. art. E § 4.
Id. art. E § 8.
Id. art. E § 5.
Id. art. E § 26.
Id.
See id. art. E § 16 para. a.
Id.
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the NFL’s current policies. Specifically, it is very different from the
NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy.
II. NFL BACKGROUND
Over the course of the 2017–2018 season, the NFL
encountered many off-the-field stories. The season began with players
across the league kneeling during the National Anthem in protest of
the current political climate related to police brutality. 176 The protests
garnered so much attention that President Donald Trump responded,
calling the players “‘sons of bitches’” and the NFL “‘weak and out of
control.’” 177 The league has also endured constant criticism of its
handling of concussions; numerous players have taken enormous hits
and then returned to play very quickly, causing many to question the
validity of the NFL’s concussion protocol, with some calling the policy
“‘a fraud.’” 178 A recent criticism stems from how the Carolina Panthers
handled quarterback Cam Newton during the Wild Card Round of the
2017-2018 Playoffs. 179 Newton sustained a hit and remained on the
ground, but only missed one play after the team determined that he
had just been poked in the eye. 180 What constitutes big news in the
NFL is more a product of reaction than what the inherent issues are
with the league and its structure. Twenty-four-hour coverage by the
likes of ESPN and the NFL Network ensure that once a new story
pops up, previous stories begin to die in the public’s mind. This is what
176
Josh Hafner, Anthem Kneeling isn’t Aimed at Veterans, and other NFL Protest
TODAY
(Sept.
25,
2017,
4:32
PM),
Misconceptions,
USA
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/09/25/anthemkneeling-isnt-aimed-veterans-and-other-nfl-protest-misconceptions/701409001/.
177
Scooby Axson, Trump: NFL “Weak and Out of Control’ for Allowing Protests,
ILLUSTRATED
(Nov.
28,
2017),
SPORTS
https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/11/28/donald-trump-nfl-protest-anthem.
178
Tom Schad, Concussion Expert Calls NFL Protocol ‘fraud’ after Colts QB Jacoby
Brissett Returns, USA TODAY SPORTS (Nov. 12, 2017, 5:40 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/colts/2017/11/12/expert-calls-nflconcussion-protocol-fraud-colts-qb-jacoby-brissett-returns/856853001/.
179
Kevin Skiver, Timeline: Cam Newton Flap the Latest Blow to NFL’s Scrutinized
SPORTS
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2018,
9:33
PM),
Concussion
Protocol,
CBS
https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/timeline-cam-newton-flap-the-latest-blowto-nfls-scrutinized-concussion-protocol/.
180
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happened regarding the Ezekiel Elliott story. Once Elliott decided to
withdraw his appeal, accepting his six-game suspension, news outlets
turned to other sources for news. Despite this, the NFL’s structure is
still questionable, and it begins with the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
In July of 2011, the NFL owners voted 31–0, with the Oakland
Raiders abstaining, to approve a new ten-year collective bargaining
agreement between themselves and the players. 181 Then, once the
players also voted in favor, the 130-day lockout officially ended, and
fans’ fear that there would be no football in 2011 was assuaged. 182 One
of the main issues was revenue sharing. 183 Under the owners’ plan,
revenue would be split only after $1 billion was portioned out for the
owners. 184 The ultimate resolution of this was a 52/48 split of the
revenue between the owners and the players, which represented a
lower share for the players than the previous deal. 185 However, teams
would now have to reach a floor of 89% of the salary cap, meaning
more money in salary for veteran players. 186 This rise in veteran salary,
in addition to the new cap floor, stemmed from the institution of a
rookie wage scale. 187
Under the 2006 collective bargaining agreement, rookies
negotiated the terms of their contracts, oftentimes leading to the early
picks holding out for the best contract they could get. 188 Under the
current agreement, rookie salaries are scaled according to draft slot,
obviating the need to holdout over salary negotiations. 189 In fact, since
181
Adam Schefter, Sources: Deal to end Lockout Reached, ESPN (July 25, 2011),
www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/6797238/2011-nfl-lockout-owners-players-comedeal-all-points-sources-say.
182
Id.
183
See Brice, supra note 65, at 61.
184
See id.
185
Patrick Rishe, Who Won The 2011 NFL Lockout?, FORBES (July 21, 2011,
10:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/07/21/who-wonthe-2011-nfl-lockout/#239c18207071.
186
Id.
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Id.
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Andrew Brandt, Rookies Sacrificed in New CBA, ESPN (May 15, 2012),
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189
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the new collective bargaining agreement in 2011, the only notable
rookie to holdout was Joey Bosa in 2016. 190 Although Bosa’s salary was
predetermined, he wanted certain offset language regarding his signing
bonus removed, causing him to holdout for most of the team’s
preseason training camp. 191 Other “wins” for the players included a
reduction in the number of “Organized Team Activity” sessions and a
10% increase in minimum salaries in the first year, with continual
increases thereafter. 192 According to reports, once the owners
approved the agreement, there was a high level of confidence that the
players would follow suit due to the “working relationship between
[DeMaurice] Smith and . . . Roger Goodell. . . .” 193 The two had
reportedly worked together very closely to ensure that any “remaining
issues were resolved.” 194 Times certainly have changed. Before
discussing specific instances of the NFL’s flaws playing out in court
and what changes should be made, a review of the NFL Collective
Bargaining Agreement is necessary.
A. NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement
Governed by, construed, and interpreted under New York
law, the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (NFL CBA) is the
product of “bona fide, arm’s length collective bargaining” and “the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and future
employee players in the NFL.” 196 The agreement covers a bargaining
unit that consists of all current NFL players, all veteran free agents, 197
drafted rookies, and rookie free agents. 198 The NFL CBA, spanning
195

190
Nate Davis, Joey Bosa Ends Holdout, Signs Contract with Chargers, USA
TODAY
SPORTS
(Aug.
29,
2016,
6:57
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/chargers/2016/08/29/joey-bosacontract-san-diego-chargers/89549298/.
191
Id.
192
Rishe, supra note 185.
193
Schefter, supra note 181.
194
Id.
195
NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. 70 § 1 (2011)
[hereinafter NFL CBA].
196
Id. “Preamble.”
197
Players who were once on an NFL team, but are currently not on a roster
or practice squad.
198
NFL CBA, supra note 195, at “Preamble.”
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300 pages and 70 articles, covers topics including contracts, 199 the
college draft, 200 collusion between teams, 201 and the “Pro Bowl” all-star
game. 202 Interestingly, article 3 section 1 of the NFL CBA provides that
neither the NFL Players Association, “nor any of its members will
engage in any strike, work stoppage or other concerted action” that
interferes with the operation of the NFL or any team. 203 However, the
potential 2021 lockout, like the 2011 lockout, will almost surely come
after the NFL CBA expires. Thus article 3 section 1 would not apply.
In terms of dispute resolution, the NFL CBA dedicates two
articles to “grievances” and two articles to team and commissioner
discipline. 204 Article 42 describes the NFL’s policy regarding discipline
handed down by teams. 205 The NFL CBA sets maximum fines teams
may levy on players for events like reporting to training camp
overweight, unexcused lateness, and even throwing a football into the
stands during a game. 206 Teams are required to inform players of all
disciplinary actions that may be taken against them at the beginning of
training camp, and in event of a violation, provide the offending player
written notice at any address the team reasonably expects the player to
be located. 207 Article 43 governs “non-injury grievance[s],” which is
defined as
[a]ny dispute . . . arising after the execution of this
Agreement and involving the interpretation of,
application of, or compliance with, any provision of
this Agreement, the NFL Player Contract, the Practice
Squad Player Contract, or any application provision of
the NFL Constitution and Bylaws or NFL Rules

199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 17.
Id. art. 38.
Id. art. 3 § 1.
See id. art. 42, 43.
See id. art. 42.
Id. § 1(a).
NFL CBA, supra note 195, § 2.
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pertaining to the terms and conditions of employment
of NFL players. . . . 208
Any and all grievances are to be resolved exclusively based on
the procedure the NFL CBA sets forth. 209 Grievances may be initiated
by players, teams, the NFL Management Council, or the NFLPA and
must be filed within fifty days of the occurrence or nonoccurrence on
which the grievance is based, or within fifty days from the date which
the party filing the grievance “became known or reasonably should
have . . . known” of the “facts of the matter . . . whichever is later.” 210
Once a grievance is filed, the party to whom it is presented must
answer within ten days setting forth admission or denials of the facts
related to the grievance, with any denial including the specific grounds
for denial. 211 If the grievance is not resolved after filing and answer, it
moves on to the appeal stage. Any appeal, whether by a player, a team,
the NFLPA, or the NFL Management Council, is to be made to the
Notice Arbitrator. 212 In the event of a grievance involving a
suspension, the suspended player will have the option to appeal
immediately without having to file the grievance with their team or the
league. 213 In such an event, an expedited hearing is to be held by an
arbitrator designated by the Notice Arbitrator within seven days and
the NFL and NFLPA are to engage in “good faith efforts” to schedule
the grievance hearing before the player’s next game. 214 In addition to
grievances involving suspensions, both the NFLPA and the NFL
Management Council can immediately appeal up to four grievances per
year, which allows for an expedited hearing within seven days. 215 In
such a case, the arbitrators are to issue their decision within five days
after completion of the hearing. 216

208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216

Id. art. 43 § 1.
Id.
Id. art. 43 § 2.
Id. § 3.
Id. § 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
NFL CBA, supra note 195, § 4.
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All relevant documents are to be submitted not later than
fourteen days before a grievance hearing. 217 Failure to do so results in
the preclusion of submitting any documents for review by the
arbitrators, with the caveat that the opposing party will still be able to
review those documents. 218 In the event of an expedited hearing, any
documentary evidence must be submitted two days before the
hearing. 219 For all hearings, the arbitration panel consists of four
arbitrators, “whose appointment must be accepted in writing by the
NFLPA and the [NFL] Management Council,” even though only one
arbitrator hears the grievance. 220 Either of those two parties “may
discharge a member of the arbitration panel” in writing, but only
between July 10 and July 20 each year. 221 If either party exercises this
power, the other party has two days to discharge an arbitrator of its
own choosing. 222 Both the NFLPA and NFL Management Council
must agree on any new arbitrators. 223 If they cannot agree within thirty
days, the Notice Arbitrator sends both sides a list of ten qualified
arbitrators and fourteen days after that, the NFLPA and NFL
Management Council strike names off the list back and forth until one
name is remaining. 224 The party who makes the first strike is
determined by a coin flip, with the parties alternating who strikes first
for the duration of the NFL CBA. 225 If a party decides not to
“cooperate in the striking process,” it waives its right to participate in
the selection of the appointment at issue. 226
Under the NFL CBA, hearings occur according to the
arbitrator’s schedules; each arbitrator designates a “minimum of twelve
. . . hearing dates per year . . . for use by the parties” to the NFL
CBA. 227 After consulting with the Notice Arbitrator, each arbitrator
will convey those dates to the NFLPA and the NFL Management
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

Id. § 5(b).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
NFL CBA, supra note 195, § 6.
Id.
Id. § 7(a).
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Council. 228 This process repeats, as required, each year and for each
new arbitrator that joins the panel. 229 Once the NFLPA and NFL
Management Council know which dates are available, each party
notifies each arbitrator thirty days in advance of which dates are going
to be used the following month. 230
At hearings, parties to the grievance, normally players or teams,
and the NFLPA and NFL Management Council may present any
relevant evidence, be it in the form of testimony, documents, or
otherwise. 231 Should a party’s witness be “unable to attend the
hearing,” the offering party must inform the opposing party of the
witness’s identity and unavailability. 232 The parties will then, either at
the hearing or within fourteen days thereafter, agree on dates to take
the testimony of unavailable witnesses, which must be “within fortyfive . . . days of the parties’ receipt of the hearing transcript.” 233
Another alternative to combatting unavailable witnesses is the use of
telephone conferencing, but only if both parties agree. 234
In cases where the “material facts” are not in dispute, the
arbitrator has the authority to decide the case “solely on the written
submissions of the parties.” 235 Further, if the amount claimed is less
than $25,000, the parties do not even have to meet face to face; the
hearing can be held via telephone. 236 Parties may request the
submission of post-hearing briefs for consideration by the arbitrator. 237
In such a case, and where the grievance does not involve a suspension
and less than $25,000 is at issue, the parties shall simultaneously submit
post-hearing briefs. 238 In the case of a suspension-related hearing or

228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 7(b).
Id.
NFL CBA, supra note 195, § 7(b).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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one where the claim is greater than $25,000, only the arbitrator may
request post-hearing briefs. 239
Once a hearing has been held, the arbitrator has thirty days
from the submission of post-hearing briefs to issue a written decision,
except that the arbitrator cannot consider briefs filed “more than sixty
. . . days after receipt of the last transcript, unless the parties agree
otherwise.” 240 According to Article 43, the decision of the arbitrator
constitutes the “full, final and complete disposition of the grievance,
and will be binding upon the player(s) and Club(s) involved and the
parties to [the NFL CBA].” 241 However, as will be discussed 242, in
numerous instances players have challenged the decisions of NFL
arbitrators, despite the agreed upon language in the NFL CBA.
While the arbitrator has the ultimate authority in any grievance
hearing, the NFL CBA does place some limitations on such power; the
arbitrator may not “add to, subtract from,” or change “in any way the
provisions” in the NFL CBA, nor any supporting document. 243 The
arbitrator also may not grant a remedy other than “a money award, an
order of reinstatement, suspension without pay, a stay of suspension
pending decision, a cease and desist order,” or an order of compliance
with a specific term of the NFL CBA. 244 The one alternative to the
grievance hearing process is the Grievance Settlement Committee; at
the end of each regular season, a “committee consisting of
representatives of the NFLPA and representatives of the Management
Council” meet to “engage in good faith efforts to settle or bifurcate
any pending grievances.” 245 In committee meetings, no evidence is
taken, except the involved parties “may be contacted to obtain
information about their dispute.” 246 If the committee resolves any
grievances by mutual agreement, the resolution, like an arbitrator

239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246

Id.
Id. § 8.
Id.
See infra Part II.B.
NFL CBA, supra note 195, § 8.
Id.
Id. § 13.
Id.
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ruling, constitutes the “full, final and complete disposition of the
grievance. . . .” 247
Injury grievances, claims that a player or practice squad
member was released because of an injury sustained while performing
the services required in their contract (i.e. injuries sustained in
practices, games, or training with the team), 248 are handled largely the
same as non-injury grievances. The biggest distinction between the two
types of grievances is the role of physicians; players must be examined
by a neutral physician within twenty days of filing an injury
grievance. 249 The physician may not examine the player with the aid of
supplemental medical information, either records submitted by the
team or player, or communication with the team physician. 250 The
NFLPA and NFL Management Council “maintain a jointly-approved
list of neutral physicians, including at least two orthopedic physicians
and two neuropsychologists in each city” hosting an NFL team. 251 The
list is subject to modification only between February 1 and April 15
each year. 252 During this period, both the NFLPA and NFL
Management Council “may eliminate any two neutral physicians from
the list by written notice to the other party.” 253 Should any vacancies
occur, either by the doing of a party, or otherwise, both the NFLPA
and NFL Management Council submit a list of three replacements
within thirty days. 254 If the parties are unable to agree on a choice

Id.
Id. art. 44 § 1. Many NFL contracts contain clauses that void the contract
should the player injure himself outside of team-sanctioned activities. Adam Kilgore,
Yes, there are some Things Pro Athletes aren’t Allowed to Do, WASH. POST (July 6, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2015/07/06/yes-there-aresome-things-pro-athletes-arent-allowed-to-do/?utm_term=.d67a96861f7d.
Such
restrictions are common in basketball. See id. For more on activity restrictions in
professional athletes’ contract, see id.
249
NFL CBA, supra note 195, art. 44 § 4(a).
250
Id.
251
Id. § 5.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id.
247
248
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within ten days, then they perform the odd coin-flipping, striking
procedure outlined above. 255
The NFL’s policies governing grievances are very similar to
those of FIFA, and these policies have not brought negative attention
to the NFL. Article 46, however, is the source of much of the NFL’s
bad publicity. 256 Article 46 outlines the process by which all disputes
involving a fine or suspension for on-field conduct, or action taken
against a player by the Commissioner “conduct detrimental to the
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football”
are handled. 257 The term “conduct detrimental” is not defined in the
NFL CBA. 258 In theory the term suggests that egregious acts that
induce public shame on the league will be covered. In practice,
however, the term has been used as Commissioner Roger Goodell’s
justification for imposing his own sense of morality under the guise of
“‘protecting the [NFL] shield.’” 259 In cases where Goodell decides to
take action for “conduct detrimental” he is to send written notice of
such action to the player and the NFLPA. 260 The player, or the
NFLPA, then has three business days to appeal in writing to
Goodell. 261 For on-field offenses, any fines or suspensions are levied
by “a person appointed by the Commissioner.” 262 The appointment of
said person occurs after consultation with the Executive Director of
the NFLPA. 263 Like in “conduct detrimental” cases players have three
business days to appeal in writing to the Commissioner. 264 In the case
Id.
The Legal Blitz, NFLPA Continues to Ignore the Awful CBA it Agreed
THE
LAW
(Aug.
30,
2017,
12:38
PM),
to,
ABOVE
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/08/nflpa-continues-to-ignore-the-awful-cba-itagreed-to/.
257
Id. art. 46 § 1(a).
258
See generally, id.
259
Mike Lupica, Roger Goodell and NFL are Protecting a ‘Shield’ that Fails to
Protect its Own Players and Families, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Sept. 14, 2014, 1:30 AM),
www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/lupica-shield-nfl-protecting-article1.1938945.
260
NFL CBA, supra note 195, art. 46 § 1(a).
261
Id.
262
Id. § 1(b).
263
Id.
264
Id.
255
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of a “conduct detrimental” appeal, the Commissioner appoints one or
more designees to serve as hearing officers. 265
In contrast, for on-field punishment appeals, the
Commissioner and the Executive Director of the NFLPA, on a yearly
basis, “jointly select two . . . or more designees to serve as hearing
officers.” 266 Article 46 also provides for appeals in cases arising from
“conduct detrimental.” 267 In such cases, “the Commissioner may serve
as hearing officer in any appeal under Section 1(a) of this Article at his
discretion.” 268 This difference in the appeals process is essential to the
criticism endured by Roger Goodell. Thus, what Article 46 boils down
to is Goodell’s ability to serve as judge, jury, executioner, and court of
appeals in cases involving “conduct detrimental” to the NFL. This
enormous power vested in Goodell can also be illustrated simply by
comparing the length of Article 46 with that of Articles 43 and 44:
Article 46 spans less than three pages in the CBA, while Articles 43
and 44 combine for over twelve pages. While the rules governing
normal disputes appear to be heavily bargained for, when it comes to
Commissioner discipline, Roger Goodell seems to have applied the
league’s massive leverage (discussed infra) directly against the players’
throats.
B. Tom Brady and Ezekiel Elliott
No two stories have generated more coverage and scrutiny of
Roger Goodell’s powers than Tom Brady and “Deflategate” and the
recent Ezekiel Elliott saga. “Deflategate” can be described as nothing
short of a debacle, spanning 544 days and ultimately ending with
Goodell coming out on top, as he always does. 269 The saga began after
Indianapolis Colts linebacker D’Qwell Jackson intercepted one of
Brady’s passes in the 2015 AFC Championship Game and handed “the
ball to a member of the Colts’ equipment staff, who noticed the ball
seemed underinflated and notified coach Chuck Pagano.” 270 After the
265
266
267
268
269
270

Id. § 2(a).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Deflategate Timeline, supra note 64.
Id.
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game, which the Patriots won handedly 45-7, ESPN’s Chris Mortensen
reported that eleven of the twelve “balls used in the first half of the
game were significantly underinflated.” 271 Three days later, the NFL
announced that it was launching an investigation into the deflated
footballs led by Jeff Pash and Ted Wells. 272 The Patriots then went on
to defeat the Seattle Seahawks in Super Bowl XLIX 28-24. 273 On May
6, 2015, after almost five months and millions of dollars, the “Wells
Report” is released, in which the NFL stated that it was “‘more
probable than not’ that Patriots personnel deliberately deflated
footballs . . . and that Brady was probably ‘at least generally aware’ of
the rules violations.” 274 Tom Brady was suspended for four games and
the Patriots were fined $1 million and forfeited two draft picks. 275
When the NFLPA announced Brady was to appeal the
suspension, it urged Goodell to appoint a neutral arbitrator; however,
the NFL announced that Goodell would, in fact, preside over the
appeal. 276 In a letter to the NFLPA Goodell officially informed the
union that he would be presiding over the appeal, citing his
responsibility under the NFL CBA to “‘serve as hearing officer in any
appeal involving conduct detrimental to the integrity of the game.’” 277
On June 23, 2015, Goodell heard Brady’s appeal, and five days later,
the NFL announced that the suspension would not be reduced. 278
Brady then filed a cause of action in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York challenging Goodell’s decision. 279 On
September 3, 2015, Judge Richard Berman vacated the four-game
suspension. 280 In so doing, Judge Berman criticized Roger Goodell for
“‘dispens[ing] his own brand of industrial justice.’” 281 In response to
Id.
Id.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
See Deflategate Timeline, supra note 64.
278
Id.
279
See generally NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
280
Id. at 472–74.
281
Id. at 462 (quoting 187 Concourse Assocs. v. Fishman, 399 F.3d 524, 527 (2d
Cir. 2005)).
271
272
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the ruling, the NFL appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in New York. 282 The appeal was heard on March 3,
2016, over a year after the Patriots’ win over the Colts. 283 On April 25,
2016, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling, reinstating
the suspension. 284 The court reasoned that Goodell properly exercised
his broad discretion as arbitrator, discretion that was properly
grounded in the NFL CBA and that did not deprive Brady of
“fundamental
[]fairness.” 285
Specifically, the court noted that “the parties contracted in the CBA to
specifically allow the Commissioner to sit as the arbitrator in all
disputes brought pursuant to Article 46, Section 1(a)” and that “[t]hey
did so knowing full well that the Commissioner had the sole power of
determining what constitutes ‘conduct detrimental,’. . . .” 286 After this
ruling, Brady filed a motion for a second hearing, which was denied. 287
Brady ended up serving his four-game suspension at the beginning of
the 2016 season, which ended with the Patriots defeating the Atlanta
Falcons in Super Bowl LI. 288
The Ezekiel Elliott saga, while not as prolonged as
“Deflategate,” followed a very similar path. On August 11, 2017, after
a year-long investigation, the NFL announced that it was suspending
Elliott for six games after finding that Elliott assaulted his former
girlfriend, Tiffany Thompson. 289 Elliott was originally accused by
Thompson in July of 2016, but after months of investigation,
prosecutors announced in September 2016 that Elliott “would not be
282
283
284

2016).

See Deflategate Timeline, supra note 64.
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See generally NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir.
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See Nate Davis, Super Bowl LI Analysis: Patriots Beat Falcons 34-28 in firstever Super Bowl OT, USA TODAY SPORTS (Feb. 5, 2017, 11:57 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2017/02/05/super-bowl-2017-51-lipatriots-falcons-analysis-tom-brady-matt-ryan/97529938/.
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Around the NFL staff, Cowboys RB Ezekiel Elliott Suspension Case Timeline,
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2017,
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charged with domestic violence.” 290 Like Brady, Elliott appealed the
suspension. 291 Unlike Brady, however, the appeal was heard by Harold
Henderson, who was appointed by Goodell, pursuant to NFL CBA
Article 46 § 2. 292 On September 1, 2017, before the final ruling on the
suspension, the NFLPA, on behalf of Elliott, filed for a “temporary
restraining order in Texas to block any suspension upheld by
Henderson.” 293 Henderson upheld the suspension on September 5,
2017, less than a week before the start of the 2017 regular season. 294
However, because of the timing of the appeal decision, Elliott was
allowed to play in Week 1. 295 Elliot then filed for a preliminary
injunction against the NFL’s enforcement of the suspension in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman
Division, which was granted by Judge Amos Mazzant on September 8,
2017. 296
In his opinion, Judge Mazzant stated that the NFL and Harold
Henderson breached the NFL CBA when Henderson denied Elliott
“access to certain procedural requirements,” including access to
“investigators notes,” the opportunity to cross examine Tiffany
Thompson, and the chance to question Roger Goodell. 297 Based on
the procedural denials, Judge Mazzant found that Elliott did not
receive a fundamentally fair hearing before Henderson. 298 Like in
Brady’s case, the NFL appealed Judge Mazzant’s ruling in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 299 Just like the Second
Circuit’s ruling in the Brady case, the Fifth Circuit vacated the lower
court’s ruling. 300 The court reasoned that Elliott’s lawsuit was
premature, because Elliott had not exhausted all his “grievance

290
291
292
293
294
295
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Id. See NFL CBA, supra note 195, art. 46 § 2.
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See generally NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL, 270 F. Supp. 3d 939 (E.D. Tex.
Id. at 948.
Id. at 953.
See generally NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL, 874 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2017).
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procedures” in the NFL CBA. 301 Thus, the District Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 302 Further, Elliott’s failure to
exhaust all remedies was not excused because the NFL abided by all
the arbitration provisions in the NFL CBA. 303
After the NFL sought affirmation of Henderson’s award in the
Southern District of New York, Elliott filed another motion for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction barring the
NFL’s enforcement of his six-game suspension. 304 The temporary
restraining order was granted on October 17, 2017, which allowed
Elliott to play until the legal process wound up. 305 A hearing for the
preliminary injunction was scheduled for October 30, 2017. 306 Elliott’s
primary argument at the preliminary injunction hearing was that he was
denied “‘fundamental fairness’” during his arbitration proceedings. 307
However, the court found that Elliott failed to establish that
Henderson’s decision was fundamentally unfair. 308 The court reasoned
that Henderson complied with all provisions of the NFL CBA, which
did not require him to allow Elliott to confront Thompson or
Goodell. 309 Like in Brady’s case, the court relied heavily on the fact that
the players collectively bargained for the provisions in the CBA. 310 As
long as the NFL complied with such provisions, which the court found
it did, Elliott’s fundamental fairness argument could not prevail. 311 On
November 15, 2017, Elliott dropped his appeal, and began serving his
suspension. 312
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III. WHAT THE NFL SHOULD DO
The Brady and Elliott cases are the most publicized and
extreme examples of NFL players fighting back against Roger
Goodell’s enormous power. While to an outsider, Brady and Elliott
may have had strong cases stemming from a fundamentally unfair
process, the NFL will continue to point to the NFL CBA as its trump
card. As long as the NFL CBA retains Article 46 as it currently is
written, courts will continue to find in favor of the NFL. If the NFL
and Roger Goodell are going to begin to revive their public image, they
should start with Article 46 during the approaching NFL CBA
negotiations; a step that does not require the drastic changes some have
called for.
A. Argument Against Trevor Brice’s Solution
Trevor Brice begins his 2013 article, entitled “Labor Pains on
the Playing Field: Why Taking a Page from Europe’s Playbook Could
Help the United States,” with an overview of the history of work
stoppages in American pro sports, as well as the current applicable
law. 313 Currently, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) creates the
collective bargaining rights of private American workers, including
professional athletes. 314 The NLRA’s purpose is to encourage
collective bargaining in order to remove “‘substantial obstructions to
the free flow of commerce.’” 315 Brice notes that “[t]he theme behind
the NLRA is that private parties engaged in business should resolve
disputes arising out of that business without government
interference.” 316 Thus, according to Brice, no one form of dispute
resolution is favored over another, making work stoppages an option
just as good as mediation or arbitration. 317 As a result, Brice argues that
because of the incentivization of the use of “economic weapons” in

https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2017/11/15/cowboys-elliott-dropsappeal-will-serve-rest-of-6-game-ban/107724034/.
313
See Brice, supra note 65, at 54–64.
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Id. at 54–55.
315
Id. at 55 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151).
316
Id. at 56.
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sports labor negotiations, the NLRA is an “ineffective means of
regulating [such] negotiations.” 318
Brice goes on to outline the governing bodies of sport in
Europe, including FIFA and UEFA. 319 Brice believes that “strong
governing organization[s] with the power to intervene in disputes,” like
FIFA, help to minimize the use of work stoppages and lockouts. 320
Because of this, Brice proposes that the United States should create a
governmental body charged with overseeing all aspects of professional
sports. 321 Brice’s key reasoning is that such a body would help take
labor disputes “out of the hands of self-interested parties and put them
into the hands of” an entity whose purpose is preserving sports. 322
Brice argues that the “new body should enforce its own statutes
through its own dispute-resolution system,” like the structure in place
with FIFA. 323
As part of this, Brice proposes that the U.S. implement new
legislation in the mold of the Railway Labor Act (RLA). 324 Enacted in
1926, the RLA’s purpose is the avoidance of “interruption of interstate
commerce by providing for the prompt resolution of labor disputes
while still protecting the right of employees to bargain collectively.” 325
To accomplish this goal, the statute imposes a duty on the parties “to
undertake all reasonable efforts toward negotiating a settlement before
allowing for the use of economic weapons.” 326 The RLA has several
provisions which encourage mediation over work stoppages and
lockouts. 327 Under the RLA, collective bargaining agreements don’t
expire, but rather have dates at which they become amendable. 328
Additionally, strikes and lockouts cannot be employed for “‘minor’”

318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328

See id. at 56.
See id. at 64–65.
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Id. at 75.
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disputes. 329 Brice believes that similar legislation, applied to sports,
would require the parties to make more of a genuine effort before
resorting to work stoppages or lockouts. 330
Brice’s argument hinges on the assumption that both athletes
and leagues have “tremendous leverage” that is uncommon in most
other labor dispute contexts. 331 However, this is simply not the case in
the NFL. In July of 2017, Seattle Seahawks cornerback Richard
Sherman, a member of the NFLPA Executive Committee, said, “‘[i]f
we want to get anything done, players have to be willing to strike.’” 332
Sherman noted that in order to seek change, players are “‘going to have
to miss games, [they’re] going to have to lose some money’” if they are
to make a point. 333 This is easy for Sherman to say because he is one
of the league’s marquee players, with an average salary of around $9
million. 334 Because of his status, he has a certain degree of leverage, but
that makes him an exception in the NFL. The vast majority of NFL
players have very little leverage compared to the billionaire owners that
employ them. This is evidenced mainly by the fact the average NFL
career is very short, and it is getting shorter. 335
According to a Wall Street Journal analysis of data from 2008 to
2014, the average NFL career is 2.66 years, down from 4.99 years in
2008. 336 Most players do not have the bank account Sherman does, and
need to cash in on what is likely to be a very short career. While
Sherman is correct in saying the players have to strike, they simply do
Id. (citing Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725–27 (1945)).
See Brice, supra note 65, at 77.
331
See id. at 55.
332
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not have the leverage to do so on a league-wide scale. Even if the top
players, who can afford to strike, do so, the lesser known players will
see that as an opportunity to play more and the league will go on. The
situation has presented itself in the past, most notably with the
Washington Redskins; in 1987, the NFLPA went on strike, leaving
teams like the Redskins to play with replacement players. 337 The league
played its schedule with the “scabs” until the regular players broke their
strike. 338 The striking players felt pressure to cross the picket line
because the teams appeared un-phased by the use of the replacement
players. 339 The Washington “Scabskins” 340 are a great example of the
disparity in leverage between the owners and the players. Because of
this disparity, the drastic measures Brice proposes are unnecessary.
Not only would Brice’s proposal require lots of time working its way
through Congress, but because NFL players are unlikely to effectively
strike, new legislation could only potentially disrupt a very successful
industry. There is a simpler solution.
B. Manageable Changes
The NFL CBA’s provisions regarding injury and non-injury
grievances341 are similar to those found in FIFA. They attempt to
provide transparency and clear guidance to the grievance process, with
input from both the NFLPA and the NFL Management Council.
Thus, the roadmap is already in place for the NFL to improve its
relations with players. The media and player criticism of the NFL and
Roger Goodell has stemmed from instances like the Brady and Elliott
suspensions. Both suspensions were handed down pursuant to Article
46, not Article 43. 342 The issue is very clearly the enormous grant of
power bestowed upon Roger Goodell by Article 46 and his role as
judge, jury and executioner. As such, rearticulating Article 46 to mirror

337
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the procedures for injury and non-injury grievances would go a long
way in improving the relationship between Goodell and the players.
One place the NFL could look to for guidance is the NBA
Collective Bargaining Agreement (NBA CBA); since entering the role
in 2014, NBA Commissioner Adam Silver has widely been viewed as
a very player-friendly commissioner. 343 Part of the reputation has come
from how Silver has dealt with players’ social activism, 344 and a large
part has come from the recent influx of money due to a new television
deal. 345 The new deal with ESPN and TNT began at the beginning of
the 2016–2017 season and is worth $24 billion over nine years. 346 The
deal is almost three times more than the previous deal. 347 When the
deal was completed in 2014, many projected that it would increase the
salary cap from $63 million to above $100 million by the 2017–2018
season. 348 The projections fell just short, with the NBA announcing in
the summer of 2017 that the 2017–2018 cap would be set at $99.093
million. 349 While not all players are paid equally, this averages out to
$8,257,750 for each of the twelve players on an active NBA roster. For
comparison, the NFL’s salary cap for the 2017–2018 season was
$177.2 million. 350 This averages out to $3,343,396.23 for each of the

Gerald Imray, Silver: NBA Relationship with Players ‘best’ in Sports, NBA (July
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fifty-three players on an active NFL roster. NBA players are very well
paid, and, in turn, they are very happy.
Commissioner Silver does not differ from Goodell just on
good will, however. The NBA CBA’s policies regarding commissioner
discipline are more player friendly than those found in the NFL. Article
XXXI, section 9 (a) of the NBA CBA states that disputes involving
action taken by the commissioner “concerning the preservation of the
integrity of, or the maintenance of public confidence in, the game of
basketball” and that results in a financial impact of less than or equal
to $50,000, are not handled as grievances and are not resolved by the
Grievance Arbitrator. 351 Like the NFL, players disciplined under this
commissioner power may appeal in writing to Silver. 352 Also like the
NFL, Silver hears the appeal and issues a written decision that, absent
subsequent appeal, constitutes the “full, final and complete
disposition” of the case. 353 However, this is only for minor cases.
Unlike the NFL, the NBA alters its commissioner discipline
procedures for more serious offenses; in the event of a suspension
under Silver’s aforementioned powers that results in a financial impact
of more than $50,000, the process is handled “in the same manner as
a Grievance.” 354 The only difference in such a proceeding is that the
Grievance Arbitrator must apply an “‘arbitrary and capricious’
standard of review.” 355 The Grievance Arbitrator has “exclusive
jurisdiction” to determine all disputes which come before him/her. 356
The NBA procedures for handling grievances, in terms of initiating the
grievance and the timing provisions, are similar to those of the NFL. 357
The Grievance Arbitrator is agreed upon by the NBA and the NBA
Players’ Association (NBAPA), and either party “may discharge the
Grievance Arbitrator by serving written notice upon him/her” and the
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000919680/article/nfl-salary-cap-for2018-season-set-at-1772-million.
351
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other party during the period between July 27 and August 1 each
year. 358
The distinction made by the NBA CBA between serious and
minor offenses, and their correlating procedures serves as a check on
Commissioner Silver’s power to deal out punishment under his
reiteration of “conduct detrimental.” The NFL would be smart to
adopt a similar model. The NBA’s policy allows for the commissioner
to have a certain degree of latitude in wielding the power he rightly has,
but also allows for independent review in serious cases where the
player is even more likely to challenge the punishment. A twelve-game
suspension in the NBA (~14% of regular season games) is roughly
equivalent to a two-game suspension in the NFL (12.5% of regular
season games). Were the NFL to adopt this distinction in procedure,
suspensions like those challenged in “Deflategate” and Elliott’s case
would be reviewed by an independent party, possibly eliminating the
need to take the case to Federal court. The NBA’s model is just one
route the NFL could take in the approaching CBA negotiations,
however. Whatever the NFL does, it must consider how the policies
will be viewed by a group of players who already do not trust Goodell.
This one minor tweak could go a long way towards rebuilding that
trust.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the NFL remains the top sports league in the United
States, it is no secret that the NFL is in a different place than it used to
be. While the league saw its television ratings increase this past season
by 5%, 359 the NFL saw ratings drop 9.7% during the 2017-2018 season,
a further decline from the 8% decrease during the 2016-2017 season. 360
The 2016 season’s drop was been attributed to the unusual Presidential

Id. § 7(a).
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race, 361 while the more recent decline, according to one survey, was
mainly due to players kneeling during the National Anthem. 362 The rise
in ratings during the 2018 season has been attributed to higher
offensive outputs that created exciting, close games. 363 It is also likely
that fans tuned in more frequently because there was no overbearing
controversy like the Tom Brady and Ezekiel Elliott situations. The
NFL appears as though it is recovering from the slide it endured from
2016-2018; however, the league’s image could still use some refreshing,
and the first step is rebuilding trust with the players. While the NFL
has survived lockouts before, there is a possibility that some Americans
could find other ways to entertain themselves, or become fed up with
the league, a lockout could not come at a worse time. The NFL’s worst
public relations nightmare would be DeMaurice Smith and the NFLPA
allowing the league to slip into another lockout in 2021. The NFL, and
Roger Goodell, must think hard about whether power is more
important than a good relationship with the players, not only for their
sake, but also for the millions of fans who live and die with their teams.
Daniel Kraker and David Morris best summed up the place
professional sports teams have in their communities:
This combination of emotion, history and
entertainment make sports a business unlike any other.
The people of Detroit don’t congregate around the
television to watch Ford or GM workers build cars;
Seattle residents don’t watch Microsoft employees
design software. But rooting for the Tigers and the
Supersonics and the Lions is a natural communal
activity. 364
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A fall without NFL football would crush so many people, and
so many communities that depend on their team, in both economic
and noneconomic ways. Despite the comments Smith has made,
because of the disparity in leverage between the owners and the
players, a lengthy lockout is unlikely. But this does not mean that
Goodell cannot take a page out of Adam Silver’s book and relinquish
some power in order to build better relationships with the players, and,
as a result, a better relationship with the fans. After all, without fan
support the NFL would cease to exist.
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